NGINX

CVE-2026-18329: NGINX ngx_http_js_module vulnerability

Description NGINX JavaScript (njs) and QuickJS (qjs) engines have a vulnerability when a js_access handler performs asynchronous request body processing and an exception is thrown during asynchronous access-control evaluation before an explicit access denial is returned.

Published

ExploitedNot in CISA KEV
Ransomware useNot reportedPer CISA
SeverityHIGHCVSS 4.0 8.8
EPSS0.38%Chance of exploitation in 30 days
Public exploitNot tracked
FixAvailable

Automatic summary from the vendor's CVE record. We haven't written a full analysis of this vulnerability yet.

Affected and fixed versions

Product / branchFixed in
NGINX JavaScript 1.01.0.1 or later
NGINX JavaScript 0.9* or later

Always confirm against the vendor advisory, which lists every fixed hotfix.

What it is

Description

NGINX JavaScript (njs) and QuickJS (qjs) engines have a vulnerability when a js_access handler performs asynchronous request body processing and an exception is thrown during asynchronous access-control evaluation before an explicit access denial is returned. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request that triggers an error condition in the access validation logic. This may cause the js_access phase to fail open, allowing the request to proceed instead of being denied, resulting in an authentication or authorization bypass and unauthorized access to protected resources.

Impact

This vulnerability may allow remote attackers to bypass js_access controls. There is no control plane exposure; this is a data plane issue only.

Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.

Workarounds

* To secure your NGINX njs js_access handler against unhandled exceptions such as JSON.parse failures, wrap your logic in a robust try/catch block with a default strict deny policy that returns an HTML 403 Forbidden response code. For example:async function auth(r) { try { // 1. Guard input: Safely check for the Authorization header var authHeader = r.headersIn ? r.headersIn.Authorization : undefined; if (!authHeader) { r.warn("Access Denied: Missing Authorization header."); return r.return(401); } // 2. Perform the async HTTP request let reply = await ngx.fetch(' http://authsvc/check ', { headers: { Authorization: authHeader } }); // 3. Validate response status if (reply.status !== 200) { r.warn(`Access Denied: Auth service returned status ${reply.status}`); return r.return(401); } // 4. Read response body // Note: ngx.fetch body is read asynchronously using .text() or .json() let responseText = await reply.text(); let payload = {}; // 5. Guard JSON.parse explicitly try { payload = JSON.parse(responseText); } catch (jsonError) { r.error(`Security Warning: Failed to parse auth service JSON payload: ${jsonError.message}`); // Explicitly deny the request due to malformed auth response payload return r.return(403); } // 6. Validate the contents of the parsed JSON if (payload.authorized !== true) { r.warn("Access Denied: Client token validated but not authorized."); return r.return(403); } // 7. Success: Explicitly allow the request to proceed return r.return(200); } catch (globalError) { // 8. Global Catch-All: Block the bypass vulnerability on any script exception r.error(`Security Critical: Unhandled exception in auth handler: ${globalError.toString()}`); // Always return 403 (Deny) on exception to guarantee a fail-closed state. return r.return(403); } } export default { auth };

  • Place a security enforcement layer such as F5 WAF for NGINX or BIG-IP Advanced WAF before NGINX njs to prevent malformed requests. Configure the WAF to do the following: * Validate JSON syntax Enforce request body limits Block malformed payloads
  • Reject unexpected content types Apply API schema validation

Sources

KEV status, EPSS score and vendor data refreshed automatically, last on 12 Oct 2026.

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